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Where Next After Coman? 
 
Abstract  
This article considers the impact of the recent judgment of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union  in Case C-673/16 Coman and Others ECLI:EU:C:2018:385 in which same-
sex marriages where found to fall under the definition of ‘spouse’ in the Citizenship 
Directive. In light of recent societal and case law developments in Europe it is possible that 
Coman may come to be an important foundational case which will form part of the 
groundwork for the CJEU to advance the rights of unmarried couples in the EU migration 
context. This article examines the current position of unmarried couples (including registered 
or civil partners) under EU migration legislation as well as recent developments under the 
European Convention of Human Rights to argue that there are clear indications that EU 
migration laws need to be adapted to better suit a wider range of relationships than marriage.  
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1. Introduction  
 
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) recently decided the Coman case1 in 
which it ruled that the definition of ‘spouse’ in the EU Citizenship Directive2 refers to 
partners in same-sex marriages as well as heterosexual marriages. The case is a welcome step 
forward for the rights of same-sex couples. Although the reality of this judgement is that it 
will only affect a very narrow set of circumstances, it is a case of potentially great 
importance. When this case and other recent developments are taken in conjunction with the 
case law emanating from the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), there are hints that 
the legal status of unmarried couples may soon be advanced.3 In particular there are grounds 
to argue that  the legal conception of ‘family’ is slowly evolving in such a way that soon EU 
migration laws may need to change to accommodate relationships outside of heterosexual 
marriage.  
 
After providing an outline of how the CJEU and the ECtHR interact and can mutually 
reinforce each other to advance the law this article will briefly discuss the Coman case and its 
impact. This article then goes on to demonstrate that despite significant societal change in the 
participation and recognition of partnerships outside of marriage, EU legislation on free 
movement for EU citizens and family reunification for third country nationals provides little 
robust protection for such relationships. The recent case of Banger4 is highlighted here as 
                                                     
1 Case C-673/16 Coman and Others ECLI:EU:C:2018:385 
2 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens 
of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States 
amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 
3 For an overview of EU family reunification rights and how the CJEUs approach has shifted at various points 
see Alina Tryfonidou ‘Family Reunification Rights of (Migrant) Union Citizens: Towards a More Liberal 
Approach’  (2009) 15 (5) European Law Journal 634 
4 Case C-89/ 17 Banger ECLI:EU:C:2018:570 
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another example of recent case law which indicates the CJEU may take a more progressive 
approach to such issues in the future. Given the issues at stake in free movement and family 
reunification policies, the discussion then turns to the relevant human rights precedents. 
CJEU case law on diverse families and EU migration legislation has indicated that 
fundamental rights can play an important role in the evolution of interpretations of such 
legislation. The ECtHR has made significant strides in recent years in recognising the rights 
of more diverse families such as a same-sex couples and the case of Pajic v Croatia5 in 2016 
suggested that migration laws which do not adequately protect the family life of those outside 
of traditional marriage relationship is a matter it will take seriously in the future. The future 
potential of the CJEU to advance this area of law will also be discussed. Finally this article 
will argue that a failure to adequately protect relationships outside of marriage may also 
constitute discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation.  
 
 
2.  The CJEU and the ECtHR 
The relationship between the CJEU and the ECtHR is somewhat complicated. The European 
Union and the Council of Europe are two separate organisations. This means that the CJEU 
and the ECtHR are not institutionally related to one another. Article 6 of the Treaty of the 
European Union did introduce a provision which would entwine the two systems together 
more formally as it requires the EU to accede to the European Convention on Human Rights. 
However, the accession process has been stagnant for years and seems unlikely to occur 
anytime soon.6 This means that that ECtHR does not currently have jurisdiction over EU law 
itself, but this does not mean it has no influence whatsoever. The ECtHR may still rule on 
                                                     
5 Application No 68453/13 Pajic v Croatia Judgment of 23 February 2016   
6 Cathryn Costello The Human Rights of Migrants and Refugees in European Law (Oxford University Press 
2016) p 7-8 
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national measures introduced by Member States even where that national measure’s purpose 
is to implement requirements under EU law.7   
 
Likewise, an informal judicial relationship has developed between the two courts over the 
years due to their overlapping duty to both interpret human rights.8 This began in the late 
sixties when the CJEU found that EU law must be compatible with fundamental rights in 
order for it to be applicable.9 This meant that the CJEU had a duty to protect and thus 
interpret human rights. Soon after, the CJEU began making references to the ECHR in its 
judgments and accorded rights protected under the ECHR ‘special status’ in EU law.10 This 
duty for the CJEU was given increased impetus when the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union was given full legal effect in 2009.11 The Charter of Fundamental Rights 
is an independent human rights document for which the CJEU has sole responsibility for 
interpretation. However, the Charter is heavily based on the ECHR. This is reflected in 
Article 52 (3) which provides that where the Charter ‘contains rights which correspond to 
rights guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the 
said Convention’. Article 53 of the Charter also states that ‘Nothing in this Charter shall be 
interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting human rights and fundamental freedoms as 
recognised … [in] the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms.’ It is also clear, however, that the Charter can provide more 
                                                     
7 Application No 24833/94 Matthews v United Kingdom Judgement of 18 February 1999  
8 Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, ‘A Tale of Two Courts: Luxembourg, Strasbourg and the Growing European Human 
Rights Acquis’ (2006) 43 Common Market Law Review 629; Guy Harpaz, The European Court of Justice and 
its Relations with the European Court of Human Rights: The Quest for Enhanced Reliance, Coherence and 
Legitimacy’ (2009) 46 (1) Common Market Law Review 105; Sonia Morano-Foadi and Lucy Vickers ‘A Matter 
for Two Courts: The Fundamental Rights Question for the EU’ in Sonia Morano-Foadi and Lucy Vickers (eds) 
Fundamental Rights in the EU: A Matter for Two Courts (Hart, 2015)   
9 Case C-29/69 Stauder v City of Ulm ECLI:EU:C:1969:57  
10 Case C-36/75 Rutli v Minstre de l’interieur ECLI-EU:C:1975:137  
11Article 6(1) Treaty on the European Union   
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extensive protection than the ECHR and there is reference to rights not contained in the 
European Convention such as in Article 3, which prohibits cloning and eugenic practices. 
Furthermore, it has been implied by the CJEU that, where rights in the Charter do not directly 
correspond to rights in the Convention, they are subject to an independent interpretation.12 




Over the past decade the rights of same-sex partners have been developed by both the ECtHR 
and the CJEU. The ECtHR has taken steps in the past decade to expand the right to family 
life to encompass same-sex relationships. In 2010 the Court, for the first time, recognised that 
same-sex relationships fall under the concept of ‘family life’ protected by Article 8 of the 
Convention.13 In Vallianatos and Others v Greece14 the Court found that the introduction of 
an alternative to marriage, a civil union, for different-sex couples only was a discriminatory 
against same-sex couples and was a violation of Article 14 with Article 8. More recently, the 
Court has found that the failure to provide same-sex couples with any mechanism for the 
legal recognition of their relationship is a violation of Article 815 and it has recognised that 
there may be discrimination where same-sex partners do not have access to marriage and thus 
cannot access certain rights enjoyed by married couples. 16 The CJEU has also taken some 
steps to increase the recognition of same-sex relationships.17 For example, in the 2013 case of 
                                                     
12 Case C-69/10 Samba Diouf ECLI:EU:C:2011:524 Advocate General Opinion para 39; Case C-399/11 Melloni 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:107 Advocate General Opinion para 109; Case C-617/10 Åkerberg Fransson 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:105 Advocate General Opinion para 87; Although this approach has not been explicitly 
endorsed by the CJEU, the rulings in all of these cases seem to fit with the Advocate General’s approach  
13 Application No 30141/04 Schalk and Kopf v Austria Judgment of 24 June 2010 
14 Application No 29381/09 and 32684/09 Vallianatos and Others v Greece Judgment of 11 July 2013 
15 Application No 18766/11 and  36030/11 Oliari and Others v Italy Judgment of 21 July 2015  
16 Application No 51362/09 Taddeucci and McCall v Italy  Judgement of 30 June 2016  
17 See Jorrit Rijpma and Nelleke Koffeman ‘Free Movement Rights for Same-Sex Couples Under EU Law: 
What Role to Play for the CJEU?’ in Daniele Gallo, Luca Paladini and Pietro Pustorino (eds) Same-Sex Couples 
before National, Supranational and International Jurisdictions’ (Springer, 2014)  
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Frederic Hay18, the Court of Justice ruled that where same sex couples have been allowed to 
enter into civil partnerships, those partnerships should attract the same employment-related 
benefits given to married couples. The recent Coman case is another significant step. 
 
3. The Coman Case   
The Coman case concerned a Romanian citizen, Mr Coman, who had lived in Belgium for a 
significant period of time and had married another man (who was an American citizen) there. 
Mr Coman enquired about getting his husband a Romanian residence permit and was 
informed that he would be refused because a same-sex marriage would not be recognised by 
the Romanian authorities. If Mr Coman’s partner had been a woman then she would have 
automatically been entitled to a Romanian residence permit. On this basis the couple brought 
a case before the Romanian courts arguing that this was discrimination on the grounds of 
sexual orientation and that it was a violation of the EU free movement rights of Mr Coman. 
The Romanian Constitutional Court referred the question of whether the term ‘spouse’ in the 
Citizenship Directive 2004/3819 included same-sex spouses to the CJEU.  
 
EU citizens who move between EU countries (including those returning to their home EU 
state from another EU country provided their residence is genuine20) are entitled to bring 
family members with them under the Citizenship Directive 2004/38.21 Article 2 (2(a)) of the 
Directive defines the family members who citizens are entitled to bring with them as 
                                                     
18 Case 267/12 Frederic Hay v Credit Agricole mutual de Charente-Maritime et des Deux-Sevres 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:823 
19 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens 
of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States 
amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 
 
20 See for example Case C -456/12 O & B ECLI: EU:C: 2014:135 
21 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens 
of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States 
amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 
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including a ‘spouse’. However, this term is not expanded on elsewhere in the Directive and it 
was unclear whether ‘spouse’ included same-sex spouses.  The Court found that the term 
‘spouse’ in the Directive refers to ‘a person joined to another person by the bonds of 
marriage’22 and is gender-neutral so it also covers same-sex marriage. The Directive does not 
give Member States any discretion when it comes to the admittance of spouses and the Court 
found that to allow states to exercise discretion would compromise the unity of the free 
movement rights of Union citizens.  
 
Several states put forward observations that they should not be required to admit same-sex 
spouses due to public policy and national identity considerations. Such arguments, 
particularly by the Latvian government, revolved around the fact that some Member States 
intend to keep the definition of marriage as a union between a man and woman. The Court 
was not persuaded by these arguments. It reasoned that public policy considerations can only 
be used to justify a derogation from a fundamental right when there is a “genuine and 
sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest of society.”23The Court found that this 
was not the case here as “the obligation for a Member State to recognise a marriage between 
persons of the same sex concluded in another Member State in accordance with the law of 
that state, for the sole purpose of granting a derived right of residence to a third-country 
national, does not undermine the institution of marriage in the first Member State…”24 The 
Court also made reference to the Charter of the Fundamental Rights and case law from the 
European Court of Human Rights to support its interpretation of the Directive. It indicated 
that the approach of the Romanian authorities would not be consistent with the right to a 
                                                     
22Case C-673/16 Coman and Others ECLI:EU:C:2018:385, para 34  
23 Case C-673/16 Coman and Others ECLI:EU:C:2018:385, para 44  
 
24 Case 673/16 Coman and Others ECLI:EU:C:2018:385, para 45 
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private and family life.25 . Thus, Romania and other Member States which do not allow for 
same-sex marriage are required to recognise same-sex marriages concluded in other EU 
states for the purposes of EU citizen free movement rights.  
 
While this case represents a positive step forward in extending the rights of same-sex couples 
it is important to recognise that this is a very limited step. Firstly, given the fact that the EU 
does not have competency over family law, the judgment clearly does not establish a 
requirement for Member States to introduce same-sex marriages for their own nationals. This 
means that nationals of those Member States that do not allow same-sex marriage and who 
cannot move to another EU state will continue to not have access to marriage. For same-sex 
partners, simply going abroad to get married will be insufficient because in order to use the 
Directive upon returning home, the citizen must have genuine residence in the other state – 
which means a stay of at least 3 months.26 Secondly, it is likely that this judgment will really 
only effect couples where there is one EU citizen who wishes to marry a third country 
national. This is because another EU national will be entitled to move within the EU via their 
own EU citizenship. .  
 
It is clear from the above description that the judgment is quite limited in its effect and seems 
more limited than the Advocate General’s Opinion on this case. The Advocate General 
discussed at length the fact that EU legislation must keep pace with changes in society.27 The 
Advocate General also reiterated the limits of Member State discretion in this area. In the 
event that ‘spouse’ was not interpreted to include same-sex marriages, the Romanian 
Constitutional Court had also asked if same-sex marriages would be covered by Article 3(2) 
                                                     
25 Case 673/16 Coman and Others ECLI:EU:C:2018:385, para 47-50 
26 Case C -456/12 O & B ECLI: EU:C: 2014:135, paras 54 and 59 
27 Case 673/16 Coman and Others ECLI:EU:C:2018:2, Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet, paras 51 -58 
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of the Directive. Article 3(2) covers: “other family members, irrespective of their nationality, 
not falling under the definition in point 2 of Article 2 who, in the country from which they 
have come, are dependants or members of the household of the Union citizen having the 
primary right of residence…” and “the partner with whom the Union citizen has a durable 
relationship, duly attested.” The Advocate General explicitly stated that same-sex couples 
could use this provision but noted that relying on it would be problematic in this case. This is 
due to the fact that Member States only have facilitate entry for such family members in 
accordance with its own legislation meaning there is a significant level of discretion for 
Member States under Article 3(2). However, the Advocate General found that this discretion 
cannot include the ability for Member States to discriminate solely on the basis of sexual 
orientation as this would be inconsistent with the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Given its 
interpretation of the term ‘spouse’ the CJEU,found it unnecessary to consider the question 
but it is interesting that the Advocate General took the opportunity to reiterate that Member 
State discretion has to be compatible with EU fundamental rights.  
Thus, the Coman case appears to offer a very limited step forwards for same-sex marriages 
and it is welcome that the Court did take the robust stance of insisting that such marriages are 
covered by the interpretation of ‘spouse’ in Directive 2004/38. However, Coman should also 
be considered in light of broader trends evident in the case law of both the CJEU and 
particularly the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ) where there seems to be a shift 
(albeit not necessarily a linear one) toward recognising that many relationships now fall 
outside the traditional marriage paradigm. It is possible that this rather limited case could 
form part of the groundwork for more significant progress in the future when it comes to EU 
migration law and relationships outside of heterosexual marriage to incorporate a much more 
diverse range of families.  
 




4. Non-Marital Relationships and EU Immigration Law 
 
In the 1980s in the case of Netherlands v Reed28 an unmarried couple argued that the term 
‘spouse’ should be extended to unmarried partners for free movement purposes and the CCJEU 
found ‘In the absence of any indication of a general social development which would justify a 
broad construction, and in the absence of any indication to the contrary in the regulation, it 
must be held that the term 'spouse' in Article 10 of the Regulation refers to a marital relationship 
only.’29 Since the time of that case there has been significant societal change. It is clear that the 
number of people choosing to establish families outside of marriage is growing. The proportion 
of people entering into marriage has declined by about 50% in the 28 EU states since the 1960s 
and the number of children born outside of marriage has also significantly increased with births 
outside of marriage outnumbering those within marriage in some Member States.30 Attitudes 
towards cohabitation as both a precursor to marriage and as a permanent alternative have 
relaxed in varying degrees all across Europe in the past two decades.31 Most EU states now 
offer some alternative to marriage, at least for same-sex couples, in the form of a civil 
partnership32 and various EU Member States including Belgium, Estonia, France, Greece, 
Malta and Portugal have introduced a form of civil partnership (alternative to marriage) for 
heterosexual couples as well as homosexual couples.33  The UK Supreme Court has just found 
                                                     
28 Case C-59/85 Netherlands v Reed ECLI:EU:C:1986:157 
29 Case C-59/85 Netherlands v Reed ECLI:EU:C:1986:157, para 15 
30 Eurostat ‘Marriage and divorce statistics’ June 2015  http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Marriage_and_divorce_statistics#Fewer_marriages.2C_more_divorces  
31 Judith Treas, Jonathan Lui, and Zoya Gubernskaya ‘Attitudes on marriage and new relationships: Cross-
national evidence on the deinstitutionalization of marriage’ (2014) 30 (54) Demographic Research 1495; Zuzana 
Zilincikova and Nicole Hienkel ‘Transition from Cohabitation to Marriage: The Role of Marital Attitudes in 
FSeven Western and Eastern European Countries’ (2018) 43 Comparative Population Studies 3 
32 Only Bulgaria, Italy, Latvia, Lithunia, Poland, Romania and Slovakia do not, see ‘Registered Partnerships’ 03 
February 2016 http://europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/family/couple/registered-partners/index_en.htm  
33 ‘Where in Europe a man and woman can get a civil partnership’ (BBC News 22 February 2017 
>https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-39039954 < accessed 28 August 2018  
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that the failure to allow different sex couples to enter a civil partnership is discriminatory.34 
Scotland and Ireland have also taken a further step and explicitly recognised the rights of stable 
couples who do not have any formalised relationship.35 
 
Despite these significant societal developments, EU migration legislation continues to 
prioritise the marital bond far above any other type of relationship.36 For example, Directive 
2004/38 does make provision for non-marriage partnerships but says that they only need to 
be recognised if the host member state treats such partnerships as equivalent to marriage.37 
Likewise as noted above, Article 3(2) of the Directive provides that Member States will 
‘facilitate entry and residence for … the partner with whom the Union citizen has a durable 
relationship, duly attested’ but this only needs to be done in accordance with national 
legislation.38 Thus in both cases, the Member States retain discretion over whether or not 
such persons are admitted or granted residence, a discretion which does not exist for married 
couples. However, if a Member State does refuse to admit an unmarried partner of an EU 
citizen under Article 3(2) they must show they have undertaken an ‘extensive examination of 
the personal circumstances and shall justify any denial of entry or residence to these 
people.’39  
 
In the recent case of Banger40 the CJEU, with many references to the Coman case, reiterated 
that Member States are required to ‘facilitate’ the entry of unregistered long-term partners 
                                                     
34 R (on the application of Steinfeld and Keidan) (Appellants) v Secretary of State for International 
Development [2018] UKSC 32  
35 See for example Scotland: The Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006 and Ireland: The Civil Partnership and 
Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act 2010  
36 Clare McGlynn  ‘Family Reunion and the Free Movement of Persons in European Union Law’ (2005) 7 
International Law Forum du droit International 159 
37 Article 2 (2(b)) Directive 2004/38  
38 Article 3(2)b Directive 2004/38/EC on the rights of the citizens of the Union and their family members to 
move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States  
39 Ibid 
40 Case C-89/ 17 Banger  ECLI:EU:C:2018:570 
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and that a refusal of a residence permit  must only be after the applicants personal 
circumstances have been properly considered and any refusal must be justified with 
reasons.41 However as the Court noted ‘in the light both of the absence of more specific rules 
in Directive 2004/38 and of the use of the words ‘in accordance with its national legislation’ 
in Article 3(2) of that directive, each Member State has a wide discretion as regards the 
selection of the factors to be taken into account.’42 The Court in Banger did reference the 
case of Rahman43 in which personal factors such as ‘the extent of economic or physical 
dependence and the degree of relationship between the family member and the Union citizen 
whom he wishes to accompany or join’44 were cited as various factors which should be taken 
into account in such decisions. It is worth noting again here that the Court in Coman, unlike 
the Advocate General, did not address the question of how this state discretion over 
unmarried partners works in relation to issues such as same-sex couples. Banger also 
established that there must be some procedure through which applicants can appeal decisions 
on residence cards. Overall, although it is clear that Member States still retain a significant 
degree of discretion, the acknowledgement by the CJEU in Banger that unmarried partners to 
EU nationals seeking residence do have rights under EU law represents another recent small 
step towards a more inclusive immigration policy for those in a non-marital relationship. 
 
The situation for non-EU nationals seeking to bring in an unmarried partner, however, is 
much more complicated. Non- EU nationals do not benefit from this requirement to provide 
reasons or engage in an extensive examination of the circumstances at all under EU migration 
laws. The Family Reunification Directive45 is an EU measure which aims to set down 
                                                     
41 Case C-89/ 17 Banger  ECLI:EU:C:2018:570, para 41  
42 Case C-89/ 17 Banger  ECLI:EU:C:2018:570, para 40 
43 Case C-89/ 17 Banger  ECLI:EU:C:2018:570, para 38 -40 
44 Case C-83/11 Rahman and others  EU:C:2012:519, para 23  
45 Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification  
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common rules for the conditions under which non-EU nationals may exercise the right to 
family reunification. The Directive defines family reunification as ‘the entry into and 
residence in a Member State by family members of a third country national residing lawfully 
in that Member State in order to preserve the family unit, whether the family relationship 
arose before or after the resident's entry.’46 Article 4(1) of this Directive provides that 
Member States shall authorise the entry and stay of the spouse of the third country national, 
provided they meet certain conditions set out by the Directive. It is important to note that 
Coman does not establish that ‘spouse’ in this Directive refers to same-sex spouses. Thus 
same-sex spouses may not necessarily be covered by this provision.  Like the Citizenship 
Directive however, the CJEU has found that Article 4(1) does not give Member States any 
discretion if the spouse meets the relevant criteria:  
‘[Article 4(1)] imposes precise positive obligations, with corresponding clearly 
defined individual rights, on the Member States, since it requires them, in the cases 
determined by the Directive, to authorise family reunification of certain members of 
the sponsor’s family, without being left a margin of appreciation.’47 
 
However, Member States do retain a large margin of appreciation over the extension of family 
reunification rights to family members other than a spouse and children such as an unmarried 
partner.48 Article 4(3) of the Directive provides: 
‘The Member States may, by law or regulation, authorise the entry and residence, 
pursuant to this Directive and subject to compliance with the conditions laid down in 
Chapter IV, of the unmarried partner, being a third country national, with whom the 
                                                     
46 Art 2(d) Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification  
47 Case C-540/03, European Parliament v Council of the European Union, 27 June 2006, para 60. 
48 The latest Commission Guidance on the Family Reunification Directive confirms this: ‘Communication from 
the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on guidance for application of Directive 
2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification’ Brussels, 3.4.2014 COM(2014) 210 final April 2014 p. 6 
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sponsor is in a duly attested stable long-term relationship, or of a third country national 
who is bound to the sponsor by a registered partnership in accordance with Article 
5(2).’ 
Thus, it is optional for Member States to grant family reunification rights to unmarried 
couples. Currently eleven Member States do not extend family reunification rights to 
unmarried partners at all.49 
 
It is possible, however, that the current position of unmarried partners in EU migration law 
will become problematic from a human rights perspective The EU does not have any 
competence as such over family law but many of the rights conferred by EU law in areas like 
employment and particularly migration depend on how the CJEU interprets private 
relationships and can fundamentally have a significant impact on national systems of family 
law.50 Fundamental rights often have an important role in these developments and the CJEU 
frequently looks to the ECtHR 51for guidance in this area. One example where the CJEU has 
significantly affected national family law systems with reference to developments under the 
European Convention of Human Rights is the case of K.B.52In K.B53,the CJEU found that the 
UKs system of refusing to allow transsexuals the ability to marry a partner of their original 
sex was unlawful, with reference to case law from the European Court of Human Rights. 54  
 
                                                     
49 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights ‘Protection against discrimination on grounds of sexual 
orientation, gender identity and sex characteristics in the EU Comparative legal analysis Update 2015’December 
2015, 89   
50 Helen Stalford ‘ Concepts of Family Under EU Law – Lessons From the ECHR’ (2002) 1 International 
Journal of Law, Policy and Family 410 
51 Mark Bell ‘Shifting Conceptions of Sexual Discrimination at the Court of Justice : from P v S to  Grant v 
SWT’ (1999) 5(1) European Law Journal 63. However the two courts do not always necessarily align in their 
conceptions of family see Helen Stalford ‘ Concepts of Family Under EU Law – Lessons From the ECHR’ 
(2002) 1 International Journal of Law, Policy and Family 410 
52 Case C -117/01 K.B. ECLI:EU:C:2004:7 
53 Ibid  
54 Case C -117/01 K.B. ECLI:EU:C:2004:7, para 33-34  
Working Paper Do Not Disseminate  
15 
 
There is some precedent for this in a migration context. The CJEU has previously ruled on 
the family reunification of unmarried couples who are not EU citizens in the case of Eyup55 
in 2000. The ruling here was based on the very specific circumstances of the case which 
concerned a couple who got divorced and remarried and the Court ruled that the period when 
the couple where divorced but still living together as a couple counted towards the necessary 
qualification period  under the EEC-Turkey Association Agreement. More interesting though, 
is the Advocate General Opinion in this case in which the interpretation of the right to a 
family life was discussed extensively and refers to the fact that to exclude Mrs Eyup from the 
interpretation of ‘family members’ might constitute a violation of her fundamental rights.56  
Both the Advocate General and the CJEU in Coman made reference to Article 7 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights which protects the right to a private and family life as 
important to the question of family migration. Both also noted that the rights contained in 
Article 7 of the Charter correspond to the meaning and scope of Article 8 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights (which also protects private and family life), on which the 
Charter is based. Likewise in Banger which concerned unmarried partners the Advocate 
General stated ‘It ought to be acknowledged that social perceptions are changing and that 
there is a range of forms of cohabitation today’ and made reference to the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights.57 It is thus instructive to examine the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on the rights of unmarried couples in order to 
better understand how it’s conception of ‘family’ has developed over time and how this may 
come to influence CJEU case law. 
 
5. Human Rights and Unmarried Couples  
                                                     
55 Case C-65/98 Eyup ECLI:EU::C:2000:336  
56Case C-65/98 Eyup ECLI:EU:C:1999:561, Opinion of Advocate General La Pergola,, para 24  
57  Case C-89/17 Banger  ECLI:EU:C:2018:225 Opinion of Advocate General Bobek, para 37 




5.1.The Concept of Family Life  
The European Court of Human Rights has long found that unmarried different-sex couples 
can be covered by the concept of ‘family life’ in Article 8 of the Convention.  In the 1980s 
the case of Johnston and Others v Ireland 58 concerned an unmarried couple who could not 
marry and thus legitimise their daughter because one of them was still married. The married 
applicant had been separated from his wife for a number of years but they did not divorce 
because it was not permitted under the Irish Constitution. The Court found that the unmarried 
couple could claim to have a ‘family life’: ‘in the present case, it is clear that the applicants, 
the first and second of whom have lived together for some fifteen years, constitute a "family" 
for the purposes of Article 8 (art. 8). They are thus entitled to its protection, notwithstanding 
the fact that their relationship exists outside marriage.’59 The fact that the right to family life 
may apply to unmarried couples has been reiterated by the Court many times over the years.60 
 
The right to family life has most recently been expanded in the context of same-sex 
relationships. In doing so, the Court has relied on the precedent of Johnston and Others as 
evidence that ‘the notion of “family” under this provision is not confined to marriage-based 
relationships and may encompass other de facto “family” ties where the parties are living 
                                                     
58 Application No 96977/82 Johnston and Others v Ireland Judgment of 18 December 1986 para 56, confirmed 
by Application No 16969/90 Keegan v Ireland Judgment of 26 May1994 
59 Ibid para 56  
60 See for example: Application No 16969/90 Keegan v Ireland Judgment of26 May 1994 para 44; Application 
No 18535/91 Kroon and Others v the Netherlands Judgment of 27 October 1994 para 30; Application No 
25735/94 Elsholz v Germany Judgment of 13 July 2000 para 43; Application No 30943/96 Sahin v Germany 11 
October 2001 para 34; Application No 45582/99 L v the Netherlands Judgment of 1 June 2004 para 35; 
Application No 39051/03 Emonet and Others v Switzerland Judgment of 13 December 2007 para 34; 
Application No 22028/04 Zaunegger v Germany Judgment of 3 December 2009 para 37; Application No 
20578/07 Anayo v Germany Judgment of 21 December 2010 para 55; Application No 35637/03 Sporer v 
Austria Judgment of 3 February 2011 para 69; Application No 17080/07 Schneider v Germany  Judgment of 15 
December 2011 para 79  
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together out of wedlock’.61  Thus the right to a family life does apply to unmarried couples and 
such couples can also argue that they have been discriminated against on the basis of their 
marital status.  
 
5.2.Marital status as a ground of discrimination 
There is a prohibition on discrimination contained in Article 14 ECHR. It provides: The 
enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without 
discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other 
status.’  
 
Article 14 allows the Court to find discrimination has occurred on the grounds of ‘other status.’ 
Marital status was confirmed to be a ground of discrimination under Article 14 in Petrov v 
Bulgaria.62 The case concerned the practice in Bulgarian prisons of allowing married inmates 
to telephone their spouse twice per week but not giving this right to unmarried partners. The 
Court stated that marriage has a special status in society63 and that ‘the Contracting States may 
be allowed a certain margin of appreciation to treat differently married and unmarried couples 
in the fields of, for instance, taxation, social security or social policy’64 but it ultimately found 
a violation of Article 14 with Article 8 because ‘it is not readily apparent why married and 
unmarried partners who have an established family life are to be given disparate treatment as 
regards the possibility to maintain contact by telephone while one of them is in custody.’65 
                                                     
61 Application No 30141/04 Schalk and Kopf v Austria Judgment of 24 June 2010 para 91 and Application No 
18984/02 P.B. and J.S. v Austria Judgment of 22 July 2010 para 27  
62 Application No 15197/02 Petrov v Bulgaria Judgment of  22 August 2008  
63Application No 15197/02 Petrov v Bulgaria Judgment of  22 August 2008, para 53 
64 Application No 15197/02 Petrov v Bulgaria Judgment of  22 August 2008, para 55  
65 Application No 15197/02 Petrov v Bulgaria Judgment of  22 August 2008, para 55  
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Thus marital status is a ground of discrimination and unmarried couples are capable of being 
discriminated against in breach of Article 14 with Article 8 under the ECHR. 
 
5.3.The Future Development of Unmarried Couples Rights  
Given the Court’s remarkable progress on the rights of same-sex couples in recent years (as 
discussed in section 2), it is possible that a similar development will be seen in cases concerning 
discrimination against unmarried couples (of both same and different sex). Some of the 
principles which have come out of the Court’s caselaw on same-sex couples should also apply 
to different-sex unmarried couples. For example, the Court has recently reiterated that 
cohabitation is not necessary for a stable relationship to fall under the right to family life in 
case law concerning same-sex couples.66   Moreover in Oliari and Others the Court stated: 
‘..in the globalised world of today various couples, married or in a registered 
partnership, experience periods during which they conduct their relationship at long 
distance, needing to maintain residence in different countries, for professional or other 
reasons. The Court considers that that fact in itself has no bearing on the existence of 
a stable committed relationship and the need for it to be protected’67 
Such a sentiment seems likely to apply to those seeking to bring an unmarried partner. Thus, it 
is possible that the Court is progressing towards a much more inclusive idea of ‘family life’ 
that is in line with the different sorts of relationships that exist today. 
 
It is important to note, however, that the progression of unmarried couples rights under the 
ECHR has not been linear. As mentioned above, in Petrov, the Court was at pains to point out 
the special status of marriage and that there are many areas of policy where discrimination on 
                                                     
66 Application No 29381/09 and 32684/09 Vallianatos and Others v Greece Judgment of 11 July 2013 para 73, 
confirmed in Application No 18766/11 and  36030/11 Oliari and Others v Italy Judgment of 21 July 2015 para 
169; Application No 68453/13 Pajic v Croatia Judgment of 23 February 2016  para 65 
67 Application No 18766/11 and 36030/11 Oliari and Others v Italy Judgment of 21 July 2015 para 169 
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the grounds of marital status would be justified. The ‘special status’ of marriage and thus the 
legitimate discrimination between unmarried and married couples has been emphasised by the 
Court in previous cases.68  
 
This ‘special status’ has also been stressed in several fairly recent cases. In Gas and Dubois v 
France69 an unmarried lesbian couple argued that they were unfairly discriminated against in 
their enjoyment of the right to family life because the first applicant had been refused a simple 
adoption order for the second applicant’s child. This simple adoption order was only available 
to married couples, unmarried different-sex couples could not get one either. The Court found 
that the applicants were not in a similar situation to married couples because ‘marriage confers 
a special status on those who enter into it. The exercise of the right to marry is protected by 
Article 12 of the Convention and gives rise to social, personal and legal consequences.’70 Thus 
there was no violation of the Convention. 
  
Likewise, in X and others v Austria71 the Court found that an unmarried same-sex couple were 
not in a comparable situation to that of a married couple because ‘the Court has repeatedly held 
that marriage confers a special status on those who enter into it. The exercise of the right to 
marry is protected by Article 12 of the Convention and gives rise to social, personal and legal 
consequences.’72 In Van der Heijden v the Netherlands73 compelling a woman to testify against 
her partner of 18 years on the grounds that they were not married was found not to be a violation 
                                                     
68 Application No 11089/84 Lindsay v the United Kingdom Decision of 11 November 1986; Application No 
27110/95 Nylund v Finland Decision of 29 June 1999; Application no 45851/99 Shackell v the United Kingdom 
Decision of 27 April 2000; Application No 13378/05 Burden v the United Kingdom Judgment of 29 April 2008 
69 Application No 25951/07 Gas and Dubois v France Judgment of 15 March 2012  
70 Application No 25951/07 Gas and Dubois v France Judgment of 15 March 2012, para 68  
71 Application No 19010/07 X and Others v Austria Judgment of 19 February 2013  
72Application No 19010/07 X and Others v Austria Judgment of 19 February 2013, para 106 
73 Application No 42857/05 Van Der Heijden v the Netherlands Judgment of 3 April 2012. It is worth noting 
that this case split the Court with significant number of Judges dissenting on the Article 14 point see Joint 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tulkens, Vajic, Spielmann, Zupancic and Laffranque 
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of Article 8 with Article 14. The Court again stressed the ‘special status’ of marriage74 and 
noted that the applicant could have avoided this consequence by getting married. 75  
 
5.4.Pajic v Croatia 
 
Despite the above case law, the ECtHR has recently indicated that when it comes to migration 
and family reunification it may take issue with marital status discrimination.  The 2016 case of 
Pajic v Croatia76 concerned Croatia’s denial of a residence permit for family reunification 
purposes to a same-sex couple on the grounds that same-sex couples were not defined as a 
‘family’ under Croatian law. The applicant argued that her relationship should be considered 
‘family life’ under Article 8 of the Convention and that denying reunification to same-sex 
couples while allowing unmarried different sex couples to reunite was directly discriminatory 
and thus a violation of Article 14 together with Article 8.  
 
The ECtHR agreed with the applicant. It reiterated that in recent years it had extended the right 
to family life beyond different-sex married-based relationships. It found that allowing 
different-sex unmarried couples to reunite but not same-sex couples was directly 
discriminatory. Furthermore, it stated that Croatia’s argument that states retain a large margin 
of discretion in immigration policy matters was an insufficiently weighty reason to justify 
discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation. In deciding whether or not there had been 
discrimination the Court hinted that it was possible that the applicants could be considered to 
be in a ‘similar situation’ to that of married couples: 
                                                     
74 Application No 42857/05 Van Der Heijden v the Netherlands Judgment of 3 April 2012, para 68 
75 Application No 42857/05 Van Der Heijden v the Netherlands Judgment of 3 April 2012, para 76 
76 Application No 68453/13 Pajic v Croatia Judgment of 23 February 
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 ‘…the initial question to be addressed by the Court is whether the applicant’s situation 
is comparable to that of unmarried different-sex couples applying for a residence 
permit for family reunification in Croatia. In making this assessment, the Court will 
bear in mind that in proceedings originating in an individual application it has to 
confine itself, as far as possible, to an examination of the concrete case before it (see, 
for example, Schalk and Kopf, cited above, § 103). Having said so, and in view of the 
applicant’s specific complaint, the Court considers that there is no need for it to 
examine whether the applicant was in a situation which is relevantly similar to that of 
a spouse in a married different-sex couple applying for family reunification.’77 
 
This mention in Pajic that the Court would not be considering whether the applicants where in 
a similar situation to married couples is reminiscent of the passage from Schalk it cites: 
‘The Court reiterates in this connection that in proceedings originating in an individual 
application it has to confine itself, as far as possible, to an examination of the concrete 
case before it (see F. v. Switzerland, cited above, § 31). Given that at present it is open 
to the applicants to enter into a registered partnership, the Court is not called upon to 
examine whether the lack of any means of legal recognition for same-sex couples 
would constitute a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8 if it still 
obtained today.’78 
The Court did then later find that the lack of any mechanism for legal recognition of same-sex 
relationships was a violation of Article 8.79 Furthermore, unlike the above statement in Schalk, 
the statement in Pajic was completely unprompted as neither the applicant nor the Croatian 
Government made any argument that the applicant’s situation should be compared to that of a 
                                                     
77 Application No 68453/13 Pajic v Croatia Judgment of 23 February 2016 para 71  
78 Application No 30141/04 Schalk and Kopf v Austria Judgment of 24 June 2010 para 103  
79 Application No 18766/11 and  36030/11 Oliari and Others v Italy Judgment of 21 July 2015  
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married couple. It could be inferred that this reference to paragraph 103 of Schalk is a warning 
for Member States that the Court will rule on this issue in the future. Shortly after this ruling 
in the case of Taddeuci80 the ECtHR appeared to agree as it found discrimination where an 
unmarried same-sex couple where denied the same rights as married couples but it based its 
reasoning heavily on the fact that same-sex couples had no access to marriage. However, it 
seems odd to find that stable unmarried same-sex couples are comparable to married couples 
and not, at least partly, extend this reasoning to unmarried heterosexual couples.81  
 
The stumbling block for unmarried couples in the family reunification context is that it is an 
immigration issue. The ECtHR has often emphasised the fact that states have a wide margin of 
appreciation when it comes to immigration policy.82 This was argued by the Croatian 
government in Pajic and the Court agreed, reiterating that ‘a State is entitled, as a matter of 
well-established international law and subject to its treaty obligations, to control the entry of 
aliens into its territory and their residence there. The Convention does not guarantee the right 
of a foreign national to enter or to reside in a particular country.’83The test for discrimination 
on the grounds of marital status is not particularly rigorous: there must merely be a reasonable 
and objective justification for the difference in such treatment.84 Given that in Petrov the Court 
suggested that a wide range of policy matters could justify discrimination on the grounds of 
marital status, it seems likely that despite what it indicated in Pajic, the highly contentious 
subject of immigration policy could be an acceptable area of discrimination for the ECtHR. 
However, it is important to note that in Pajic, the ground of discrimination that decided the 
                                                     
80 Application No 51362/09 Taddeucci and McCall v Italy  Judgement of 30 June 2016  
81 This point was discussed at length in the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sicilianos para 13-14, Application No 
51362/09 Taddeucci and McCall v Italy Judgement of 30 June 2016  
 
82 See Costello, C. (2016). The Human Rights of Migrants and Refugees in European Law. Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, UK. See also Dembour, M-B. (2015). When Humans Become Migrants: Study of the European 
Court of Human Rights with an Inter-American Counterpoint. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.  
83 Application No 68453/13 Pajic v Croatia Judgment of 23 February 2016  para 58  
84 Application No 15197/02 Petrov v Bulgaria Judgment of  22 August 2008 para 54  
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case was sexual orientation which requires ‘very weighty and convincing reasons’85 to justify 
it and the ECtHR found that the immigration policy considerations were insufficient to 
establish such a justification.  
 
6. Turning to the CJEU?  
When it comes to issues of family reunification there are reasons to think that the CJEU 
would be a better venue for expanding this right. The idea of the CJEU as a human rights 
court is not uncontroversial. The fact that the interpretation of human rights is not the only 
priority of CJEU means that the CJEU sometimes makes decisions which seem to prioritise 
other concerns over human rights. The CJEU approach in cases such as Viking86 and Laval87 
which concerned rights to collective action have been criticised as demonstrating that other 
EU principles are sometimes given undue precedence over human rights concerns.88 
However there are some areas where the CJEU appears in many respects appears to uphold a 
higher standard of rights protection than the ECtHR and this includes migration issues 
generally. This is not to say that the CJEU case law on migration issues is without fault but 
its approach does tend to be more favourable to migrants than the ECtHRs. Two recent state-
of-the-art studies into the ECtHR’s approach to migration issues has found that the Court 
tends to give primacy to the legal principle that states have the right to control immigration 
over human rights considerations. Marie Dembour refers to this as the ‘Strasbourg reversal’ 
                                                     
85 Application No 19010/07 X and Others v Austria Judgment of 19 February 2013 para 99; Application No 
40016/98 Karner v Austria Judgment of 24 July 2003 para  37; Application No 33985/96 and 33986/96 Smith 
and Grady v the United Kingdom Judgment of 27 September 1999 para 90 
86 Case C-438/05 The International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line 
ECLI:EU:C:2007:772 
87 Case 341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd ECLI:EU:C:2007:809 
88 S. Douglas-Scott ‘The European Union and Human Rights after the Treaty of Lisbon’ [2011] 11(4) Human 
Rights Law Review 645, p 677; A.C.L. Davies ‘One Step Forwards, Two Steps Back? The Viking and Laval 
Cases in the ECJ’ [2008] 37(2) Industrial Law Journal 126; A. Hinarejos ‘Laval and Viking: the Right to 
Collective Action versus EU Fundamental Freedoms’[2008] 8(4) Human Rights Law Review 714, p 728; T. 
Novitz ‘Human Rights Analysis of Viking and Laval Judgments’ [2007] 10 (1) Cambridge Yearbook of 
European Legal Studies 541  
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or ‘state control principle’89  while Costello calls it the ‘statist assumption.’90 Both found that 
this principle was particularly prevalent in case law concerning family reunification.91  The 
CJEU tends to be more flexible and have a ‘wider and deeper’92 remit than the ECtHR which 
means it can and does depart from the ECtHR standard in various aspects of its approach to 
migration issues including on issues of family reunification93 
 
Costello has argued that there are various reasons why the CJEU makes a more sympathetic 
venue for family reunification issues. She points out that, unlike the ECtHR, the CJEU does 
not differentiate between family reunification and family formation (i.e. where the purpose of 
the migration is to form a family which will be particularly relevant to unmarried couples) 
and that the CJEU case law on EU citizens rights, whilst muddled, has generally enhanced 
the family reunification rights of those who can show a close family relationship with an EU 
citizen.94 She also argues that whilst there clearly is a distinction in the case law between the 
treatment of those who can show a relationship to an EU citizen and third country nationals 
seeking family reunification under the Family Reunification Directive, the CJEU appears to 
take a ‘citizenship-style’ approach to its analysis on cases concerning third country nationals 
with an independent right of residence.95 It is worth noting that the CJEU is not always 
consistently progressive in it’s understanding of ‘family’. In the Garcia Nieto96 case which 
                                                     
89 Marie-Benedicte Dembour, When Humans Become Migrants: A Study of the European Court of Human 
Rights with an Inter-American Counterpoint (Oxford University Press 2015) 1, 3-5.  
90 Cathryn Costello, The Human Rights of Migrants and Refugees in European Law (Oxford University Press 
2016) 9-12. 
91 See ‘Dislocating Families: The Strasbourg Reversal’ in Marie-Benedicte Dembour, When Humans Become 
Migrants: A Study of the European Court of Human Rights with an Inter-American Counterpoint (Oxford 
University Press 2015) and ‘Human Rights to Family Life and Family Reunification’ in Cathryn Costello, The 
Human Rights of Migrants and Refugees in European Law (Oxford University Press 2016); 
92 Cathryn Costello, The Human Rights of Migrants and Refugees in European Law (Oxford University Press 
2016) p 53 
93 ibid p 49; p 130-163 
94 ibid p 132-139  
95 ibidp 153-154 
96 Case C-299/14 Garcia Nieto ECLI:EU:C:2016:114  
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concerned an unmarried couple with children, the Court appeared to implicitly consider an 
unmarried couple to not be technically ‘family’ under Article 24(2) of the Citizenship 
Directive.  However, Costello  also argues that both the CJEU and the ECtHR play an 
important role in the development of this right, as it is the ECtHR who is best placed to 
provide the underlying interpretation of who and what is meant by the term ‘family’ and hints 
that the way forward is for a ‘productive and progressive’ ‘cross fertilization’ in the case 
law97 to better enhance family reunification rights.  
 
 
7. Discrimination on the Grounds of Sexual Orientation 
 
It is vital to recognise that the Coman case does not completely address the issue of 
discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation. Indirect discrimination on the grounds of 
sexual oreintaiton may arise from discrimination against unmarried couples. Indirect 
discrimination occurs when there is a policy or practice which, when applied, has the effect of 
disproportionately disadvantaging a certain group or groups and there is no legitimate 
justification for this.98 The ECtHR has recognised that indirect discrimination can result in 
violations of the Convention.99 The policy that marriage is the only relationship where there is 
no discretion for a Member State to refuse entry to the partner of an EU citizen or third country 
national clearly disadvantages same sex couples.  
 
                                                     
97 Cathryn Costello, The Human Rights of Migrants and Refugees in European Law (Oxford University Press 
2016) p 169  
98 Aileen McColgan Discrimination and Equality Law (Oxford University Press, 2014) 6  
99 See for example Application No 24746/94 Jordan v United Kingdom Judgment of 4 May 2001 para 154; 
Application No 58641/00 Hoogendijk v the Netherlands Judgment of 06 January 2005; Application No 
57325/00 D.H. and Others v Czech Republic Judgment of 13 November 2007; Application No 15766/03 Orsus 
and Others v Croatia Judgment of 17 July 2008; Application No 43835/11 S.A.S v France Judgment of 1 July 
2014 para 161 
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Whilst the ECtHR (problematically100) previously argued that different sex couples had the 
option to marry to enforce their rights, the same can certainly not be said for many same-sex 
couples around the world. Only 24 countries allow same-sex couples to marry .101 This means 
that the limitation of migration rights to ‘spouses’ has a significant impact on same-sex 
couples. For example, if Mr Coman had met his partner, an American, in Romania and 
together they had wanted to move to Poland, a country which also does not recognise same-
sex marriage. Then, under the Coman judgment, it appears that Mr Coman and his partner 
would have to take up genuine residence in a third Member State which does have same-sex 
marriage for a significant period of time, get married and then they could move to Poland. 
Firstly, this situation would clearly be financially prohibitive for many people. Secondly 
there is the issue of getting the third country national residence in the third Member State 
prior to marriage. It seems necessary that the partners would have to move to the third state 
together as in Coman the judgment clearly states ‘the residence of the Union citizen in the 
host Member State must have been sufficiently genuine to enable that citizen to create or 
strengthen family life.’102 
 
The situation is even more problematic for third country nationals who are part of a same-sex 
couple and trying to exercise family reunification rights in the EU. As stated above the 
Coman case did not determine the meaning of ‘spouse’ in the Family Reunification Directive 
but even if this is interpreted to include same-sex marriages there will still be issues. A third 
country national who is in an EU state which does not recognise same-sex marriage would 
                                                     
100 It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss this in depth but there are numerous ideological arguments 
why a heterosexual couple may be unable to enter into marriage without compromising their beliefs as was the 
case in the recent UK case on access to civil partnerships for different sex couples: R (on the application of 
Steinfeld and Keidan) (Appellants) v Secretary of State for International Development [2018] UKSC 32. See 
Clare Chambers Against Marriage (Oxford University Press, 2017) for an overview of such arguments. 
101 International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association ‘Maps -Sexual Orientation Laws: 
Recognition’ October 2017 https://ilga.org/maps-sexual-orientation-laws  
102 Case C-673/16 Coman and Others ECLI:EU:C:2018:385 para 25  
Working Paper Do Not Disseminate  
27 
 
have to get both himself and his partner into a third EU state to get married. Even if the 
sponsor was in an EU state which does recognise same-sex marriage they may refuse family 
reunification for unmarried couples, thus making it impossible for the couple to have their 
relationship officially recognised. Again, leaving aside the logistical realities of third country 
nationals navigating immigration laws in the EU, this would likely be a significant financial 
burden.  
 
The CJEU’s definition of ‘spouse’ as a person joined to another person by the bonds of 
marriage” and the fact that the Citizenship Directive makes specific reference to registered 
partnerships makes it clear that Civil Partnerships are not, in the legal sense, equivalent to 
marriage and fall within state discretion.103 Thus for the purposes of free movement those in 
civil or registered partnerships drift between recognition and being rendered un-partnered 
depending on which state they are in.104 Even if they were covered by the Directives, only 28 
countries offer civil partnerships and the vast majority of those also offer same-sex marriage,105 
meaning there are more than one hundred and fifty countries where same sex couples have 
absolutely no means of having their relationship officially recognised. Indeed, homosexuality 
remains criminalised in 72 states and 8 states impose the death penalty on those found guilty 
of homosexuality.106 Thus, it would appear to be a rather clear-cut case of indirect 
discrimination. By prioritising marriage as the marker of an important relationship, those who 
have no ability to marry are significantly disenfranchised meaning there is discrimination on 
the grounds of sexual orientation.  
                                                     
103 The distinction was last confirmed by the Court in early 2000s in Case C-125/99 P –Sweden v D and Council 
ECLI:EU:C:2001:304 
104 Mark Bell, ‘Holding Back the Tide? Cross-Border Recognition of Same-Sex Partnerships within the 
European Union’ (2004) 5 European Review of Private Law 613, 624 
105 International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association ‘Maps -Sexual Orientation Laws: 
Recognition’ October 2017 https://ilga.org/maps-sexual-orientation-laws 
106 International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association ‘Maps -Sexual Orientation Laws: 
Criminalisation’ October 2017 https://ilga.org/maps-sexual-orientation-laws  
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Moreover the current position seems to be at odds with the EUs commitment to equality.107 
Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights prohibits any discrimination on the grounds 
of sexual orientation. All EU legislation has to be compatible with the Charter and the 
implementation of EU law in Member States also must be in accordance with the provisions 
of the Charter. Article 10 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union explicitly 
states: Article 10 ‘In defining and implementing its policies and activities, the Union shall 
aim to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, 
disability, age or sexual orientation'. This is more than merely a prohibition on discrimination 
as it seems to require the EU to actively promote equality and make such considerations 
integral in the carrying out of its activities. A report back in 2012 for the European 
Parliament identified that there were serious problems for diverse families trying to access 
their freedom of movement and family reunification rights, highlighting this as an issue for 
both EU citizens and third country nationals.108 Yet little progress has been made in this area 
over the last five years. It is perhaps time for the CJEU to intervene.  
 
8. Conclusion 
Although an in-depth analysis of the Coman case itself may only affect a narrow set of 
circumstancs, it is possibly an important foundational case which will form part of the 
groundwork for the CJEU to advance the rights of unmarried couples. The numerous 
citations of the Coman case in Banger, which acknowledged non-married partners of EU 
citizens as having rights under EU law, demonstrates its potential. Marriage is no longer the 
                                                     
107 Jessica Guth ‘When is a Partner Not a Partner? Conceptualisations of ‘family’ in EU Free Movement Law’ ( 
2011 33(2) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 193  
108 Vanessa Leigh, Levent Altan and  Jordan Long ‘Towards an EU Roadmap for Equality on the Grounds of 
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only indicator of a long-term partnership and several EU states have provided various official 
alternatives to the traditional marriage relationships. It is vital that EU migration legislation 
reflects this. This is especially important given the increasing recognition by the Courts that 
such relationships should be protected under the right to a family and private life and the 
potential for discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation where such relationships are 
not appropriately recognised in legislation.  
 
 
 
